Friday, August 08, 2014

When it comes to internet governance, India still actively engages with the UN

A final draft resolution at the United Nations, passed in July 2014, has focused on the UN General Assembly’s review process of World Summit on the Information Society outcomes implementation. India has been lauded for its leadership in producing this document which calls information and communication technologies (ICTs) ‘enablers and drivers for the achievement of Millennium Development Goals and the promotion of the economic, social and environmental components of sustainable development and should be given due consideration in the elaboration of the post-2015 development agenda.’ There is also another achievement India is proud of; the document reaffirms the centrality of the General Assembly to this review process, as well as the role of the Commission on Science and Technology for Development in assisting the Economic and Social Council as the focal point in the system-wide follow-up. In his statement on the matter, India’s Permanent Representative to the UN Ambassador Asoke Mukerji, welcomed this document as a win for multilateral negotiation processes. He also welcomed that the fact that the review has been mandated as an “intergovernmental negotiation process” which takes into account inputs from member states, observer states, observers and all relevant WSIS stakeholders.
What exactly is this WSIS then? The WSIS, as it is known, was a two phase UN summit that strived to achieve a vision of a ‘people-centric, inclusive and development-oriented Information Society where everyone can create, access, utilize and share information.’ This meeting included not just governments in the process of crafting a vision of the future, but civil society, businesses, engineers and academics as well. It held its first meeting in Geneva, Switzerland in 2003, and its final meeting in Tunis, Tunisa in 2005. By the time it had concluded, the WSIS had prepared a document known as the Tunis Agenda. The document had focused on the particular problem of the ‘digital divide’, giving information and communication technologies (ICTs) a pride of place as a development tool. In its first part, the document focused on the financial instruments needed to bridge this digital divide, the document ‘encouraged governments’ to ‘give appropriate priority to ICTs, including traditional ICTs such as broadcast radio and television, in their national development strategies.’ The document also gave weight to the growing importance of ICTs as a development enabler, to achieve the goals and objectives of the Millennium Development Goals and called for a ‘Digital Solidarity Fund’.
The Tunis Agenda also went on to focus on internet governance mechanisms, and called for a multistakeholder effort to build an information society. It also suggested that ‘governments and other stakeholders should identify those areas where further effort and resources are required, and jointly identify, and where appropriate develop, implementation strategies, mechanisms and processes for WSIS outcomes at international, regional, national and local levels.’ The document certainly acknowledged the leading role of governments, and even had a clause for ‘enhanced cooperation’ stating: ‘we further recognize the need for enhanced cooperation in the future, to enable governments, on an equal footing, to carry out their roles and responsibilities, in international public policy issues pertaining to the Internet, but not in the day-to-day technical and operational matters, that do not impact on international public policy issues.’
There was another facet to WSIS. The process had actually sought to involve multistakeholders in internet governance, inviting business and private sector to actively participate in the intergovernmental preparatory process of the Summit and the Summit itself. Unfortunately, the exact nature of this involvement was never quite clear, and the end result was a bitter fight about the contours of participation. Ultimately, the official (government) WSIS declaration was accompanied by a Civil Society WSIS Declaration as well, entitled ‘Shaping Information Societies for Human Needs.’ Since then, a struggle over a government-led internet governance structure or a multistakeholder internet governance system has been raging. And in the intervening years, the internet itself has matured, the global cyber market has grown, as has crime, and the promises of ICT for development are steadily being acted upon the world over. Many have sought to ‘retire’ the Tunis Agenda as it espouses a classical, pre-Internet view of policy making that reserves it exclusively to sovereign states, thought it should be pointed out that the document also created the Internet Governance Forum, a global multistakeholder platform that feeds into internet policy issues around the world.
In a sense, this resolution, negotiated by India on behalf of Group of 77 and China, is a continuing effort by the country to keep alive the multilateral mechanisms relating to internet governance issues relevant, with specific focus on issues that matter to developing countries; bridging the digital divide being a good example. In this context, this move, to complete modalities for the overall review of the outcomes of WSIS has special significance. This significance should also be seen in the backdrop of Indian participation at Netmundial in Brazil in 2014, where theIndian representative squarely listed outIndia’s desire to achieve an ‘equinet’ and talked of the ‘the role of the governments in the Internet governance, of course in close collaboration and consultation with other stakeholders is an imperative,’ a strategy being demonstrated with further engagement with the UN system.

Friday, August 01, 2014

Reframing the global Internet ecosystem

As the conversations around internet governance become trapped in confrontational language – ‘war’ between sovereigntist and multistakeholder models – it is time to move the emphasis back to the evolution of governance structures and decision making that works for all.

Mainstream media might not quite betray it yet, but there is a slow nuance to global internet governance debates that seek to understand the apparent face-off between two camps – the (market-led) multistakeholder camp and the (government-led) sovereigntist camp. There is an effort by scholars to move away from the dominant discourse – that a vote for multistakeholderism (MSM) is a vote for democracy, and anyone who dares to question the effectiveness of a multistakeholder decision making governance process is actually voting against democracy. This simplification, often offered by Western media and then echoed around the world, might be able to capture some of the arguments being made for either system, but it often fails to understand the nuances of what is really being debated, and why some governments offer an alternative viewpoint. The geo-political dimensions of this debate needs to be examined deeply and unpacked a little.

The first step is to understand the current distributed nature of internet governance structures. Broadly speaking, there is an‘infrastructural layer’, which has organizations like the ITU (International Telecommunications Union) and the IEEE (The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers). According to some scholars, this is the layer concerned with connectivity, universal access and concepts such as net neutrality. There is then the ‘logical layer’ of the internet, defined by ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers). ICANN has been in the news of late, where a battle over who gets to decide the internet’s Domain Name System – online real estate, if you will – and the operation of root name servers, is underway. This would be one of the fundamental critical resources that the internet is built on. A third, ‘content layer’, hosts organizations such as WTO (World Trade Organization), WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organization, IGF (Internet Governance Forum) and the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) that deal with intellectual property rights, cyber crime and other issues. Vint Cerf, in his paper ‘Internet Governance Is Our Shared Responsibility’[1] has also added another layer to the mix – the ‘social layer’ where organizations like the Human Rights Council and UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization)work on trust, identity, human rights, and internet governance principles (which would include net neutrality).

A good place to start is identifying the debate: (i) are governments fighting between a distributed governance structure as we have now, or a single body (either under the aegis of the UN or simply government-led) to decide on all governance issues, (ii) are governments agreeing to stay with the distributed structure but arguing that about their role in some of these organizations, that is, some governments want their vote to carry more weight within a multistakeholder system, and (iii) are some governments calling for some common rules – a treaty perhaps --  for cyber security (including cyber warfare, surveillance, crime) while insisting the rest of major internet governance decisions should be taken within national borders.

In the first paper released by the Global Commission on Internet Governance, launched by two independent global think tanks, the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), the former dean of the Kennedy School at Harvard, Joseph Nye, writes, “it is unlikely that there will be a single overarching regime for cyberspace any time soon. A good deal of fragmentation exists now and is likely to persist. The evolution of the present regime complex, which lies halfway between a single coherent legal structure and complete fragmentation of normative structures, is more likely.”[2]

Some of this fragmentation persists because of the very different reactions the concept of multistakeholderism elicits. The current system seeks to give all actors a seat on the table; government, business, civil society, academia and the technical community alike. This democratic setup is ideally meant to ensure that the internet should not be bogged down by unnecessary regulation, and decisions are taken at ‘appropriate’ forums by relevant stakeholders. For example, some internet scholars believe the government-led body, ITU, is not the forum to discuss limiting spam, ostensibly to ‘control unsolicited bulk electronic communications and minimize its impact on international telecommunication services,’ as the conversation quickly devolves into regimes limiting free speech by terming it (as a Russian proposal sought to do in 2012) as ‘having no meaningful message.’ Using examples like this, they argue, a multistakeholder environment will ensure the internet does not fall victim to the proposals of authoritarian regimes.

Despite this logic, it isn’t easy to sell multistakeholderism across the board. There are a few explanations for this. The first pushback comes from authoritarian countries for whom democracy isn’t an inherent political philosophy they subscribe to, and so they favour a sovereign approach to IG. On the flipside, it cannot be assumed that support for MSM comes from countries who do not wish to control the internet. As Vint Cerf suggests in his paper, ‘in a more cynical view, with the recent discussions on Internet surveillance, it is also possible that one group of governments have the preference and tradition of exercising control and influence through restrictions, regulations and laws, while other governments see the openness of the Internet as an opportunity to control through surveillance of it.’[3]

The second question raised about multistakeholderism is that the entire process has been hijacked by vested interests. For example, if business were to influence civil society or even governments to vote for decisions that secure their profits, then in truth, business would, by proxy, have the most votes at the table. It might be kept in mind that private companies own most of the infrastructure the internet is built on.

The third reason is that multistakeholder arrangements are not appropriate for all discussions, for example, when discussing national cyber security issues. Most stakeholders do tend to agree that certain spaces of internet governance are the domain of the state due to the nature of the problem.

Finally, and this is a view, offered by India when it sought to reframe the view of the ‘internet’ as ‘equinet,’ which essentially makes the argument that the developed world has one set of problems that it deems are immediate – for example, intellectual property and the internet as a free trade zone – which are not the pressing problems of the developing world, where countries are still grappling with access, inclusion and last mile connectivity. Therefore, multistakeholder arrangements at the global stage might work better for countries that have attained a certain maturity in reaching internet penetration and creating markets, and government can confidently share equal space with commercial and civil society interests. For other governments, such as the Indian view expressed at Netmundial, their role as the driver of internet adoption is still key and therefore they are unwilling to share their role with commercial interests and burgeoning civil society groupings just yet. To them, while MSM has its place in the internet governance ecosystem, it cannot be applied unconditionally to any and all discussions.

However, no discussion about internet governance will be complete without mentioning another point of contention; jurisdiction. What laws is the internet subject to? Is it US law, international law, or will each country adhere to its own laws and function through bilateral and multilateral treaties? As of now, the laws of the country where data servers are located come into play. The previous Indian government suggested that the jurisdiction of the country affected should apply; that is, if Indians are victims of a certain cyber crime then Indian jurisdiction should apply, not the country where the server is located. A similar complaint is echoed when law enforcement officials from one country ask those in another country, where the server is located, to furnish information. As a reaction to jurisdictional issues (and also surveillance), recently there has been a move by many countries to locate their servers in the host country. This move is often called ‘breaking the internet’ as with costs of doing business going up (commercial enterprises will have to use multiple servers across the world) and the plethora of laws that will come into play, the internet’s default setting – a free trade zone – will be destroyed.

But crime is only one aspect of the jurisdictional issue. What laws apply to the many decentralized internet governance institutions that exist, which are decision making bodies? For example, ICANN, the organization with the power to award domain names internationally, is subject to US laws. A district court in Columbia, USA as ruled that ICANN should seize Iran’s internet domain name (.ir) and IP addresses to recover damages over $1 billion owed to terror victims. Does this mean that a US court can direct ICANN, and in a way, override the entire multistakeholder decision making process it has carefully constructed? Presently ICANN has responded to the ruling, denying that the domain names are the ‘property’ of any country, but the matter is far from over.

In fact, the French, miffed at ICANN for other reasons have actually put out an interesting proposal in the French senate on internet governance. The idea is that internet governance should evolve by an international treaty open to all states; that the Internet Governance Forum should be transformed into a ‘World Council for the Internet’ to ensure some form of conformity in the decisions taken at the various internet governance forums. Lastly, this proposal in the French Senate calls for ICANN to be reformed into the ‘World ICANN’ or WICANN, where it would adhere not to US law but the international or Swiss law. WICANN could then be under the authority of the new World Council for the Internet. Whether this idea will gain any momentum is yet to be seen, but it does make an attempt at reaching beyond the existing suggestions.

Any overhaul of the internet governance structure, or even a tweaking of the current arrangement needs to keep two important aspects in mind, other than decision-making processes: real accountability and operational feasibility. The fact is that extensive surveillance by the US government has also put a dent in international cooperation over these issues, due to a loss of trust. The answers might not be with us yet. To keep the internet free, a little freedom of thought might be in order.

The writer is a Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation

[1]Cerf, Vinton G. and Ryan, Patrick S. and Senges, Max, Internet Governance Is Our Shared Responsibility (August 13, 2013). I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society, 10 ISJLP 1 (2014).. Available at SSRN:

[2]Nye, Joseph, The Regime Complex for Managing Global Cyber Activities (May 2014). Global Commission on Internet Governance, Paper Series No. 1, (2014). Available at:
[3]Cerf, Vinton G. and Ryan, Patrick S. and Senges, Max, Internet Governance Is Our Shared Responsibility (August 13, 2013). I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society, 10 ISJLP 1 (2014).. Available at SSRN:


Friday, July 11, 2014


Would it confuse you to go on a website called www.young.indians only to find out it belonged to the Reliance group and was not a Government of India website? Would it offend you if a website ending in the suffix .ram talked about a product and not the deity? Would new forms of web addresses serve to confuse you, excite you, or just like phone numbers, would you simply add them to your address book and pay no further attention to them?

Shakespeare wondered what was in a name, but then again, it was a time before Top Level Domains, global brands with billions of dollars riding on them, and internet governance bodies like ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) existed. If the hotly contested turf war over gTLDs, or generic Top Level Domains, is anything to go by, a lot is in a name.

Take the previously mentioned cases of .indians and .ram – which have not been picked as random examples . Senior bureaucrats from the Department of Electronics & Information Technology (DeITY), Ministry of Communications and IT, Government of India have written to the President & CEO, Chairman of the Board, and Chairman of the Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC) of ICANN expressing concerns about releasing .indians to an applicant which is not the government of India. Their view is that that it is “likely that .indians string would be used in a confusing manner for many nefarious purposes, with long term damage to the growing Internet user population in the country.” Similarly, they have raised strong objections to .ram because of its “tremendous religious sensitivity” and the “attendant likelihood of misuse will have far reaching social and religious repercussions in the country.” In fact the Chrysler group, that sells vehicles under the name of Ram trucks and had applied for the gTLD for that very reason has even offered to sign an agreement with the Government of India to use the domain name with caution, and take down any strings that the GoI might find objectionable.

In 2011, ICANN decided to expand TLD from the familiar spate of domains – the and a handful of others. Predictably, there was a rush of applications from all quarters, with many comparing it to a gold rush, a digital real estate boom if you will. About 1930 applications have been made to ICANN from over 60 countries, with 322 new gTLDs approved. 209 applications have been withdrawn. In fact, India is hardly alone in its objections to certain applications, which have also included warning to applicants who have attempted to buy .islam and .bible gTLDs. The United States targeted applications booking the domains .army and .navy. Companies like Johnson & Johnson who wanted to book a closed string for .baby and L’Oreal for .makeup were also warned. The Australian government even warned an applicant for the domain .sucks for its overtly negative connotation. Australia also objected to the following: .cloud, and .wtf. Interestingly, the first warning through the ICANN GAC is known as an Early Warning Stage when applicants can drop out and get refunded 80% of their $148,000 application fees.

While objections raised on grounds on the possible offense of religious sensibilities might tend to be both predictable and understandable, such as Saudi Arabia’s opposition to gTLD’s that are associated with items that are prohibited with Islamic law — .pub, .gay, .vodka, what has been an unexpected but perhaps a much more interesting contest to observe has one from Europe:  over .wine (and .vin). Ahead of ICANN 50, France said that “addresses like .wine would put trade agreements regarding the sale of region-specific products like champagne at risk,” and that ICANN perhaps needed a “one country, one vote” system. In simple terms, France is worried that gTLDs could undermine the labeling system that wine has offline – that bottles are labeled by the region they are produced in – for example, to protect who gets to own or (in Indians terms) American winemakers have joined in as well, concerned that consumers will be deceived into believing that they are on the website of the genuine product when they are being influenced by an imitator. The crux of the matter lies in negative economic impact and negative brand value in this debate.

There have been some other interesting problems to have come up before the ICANN board – which consists of a number of internet governance experts with wide ranging policy and technical experience – one of which is a lawsuit from American victims of terrorism asking ICANN to stop turning over any domain names to Iran till it stops funding terror activities in Israel. As the letter states quite simply – “in business and legal terms it is quite simple – we are owed money, and these assets are currency worth money.”

ICANN has in front of it an increasingly complex set of decisions to make, especially as countries, corporates and citizens alike find their own reasons – moral, religious, economic, legal – to try and regulate the online real estate it controls. How ICANN will be run in the coming years is also under the scanner. Very loosely put, ICANN adopts a multistakeholder system – where a government, a corporation, a civil society organization, an engineer, an academic, have an equal say and vote in the debate, processes and outcomes – which has been, under the stewardship of the U.S. Commerce Department’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA). Though the Americans had tried to downplay their influence on ICANN, due to international pressure, they announced in March 2014 that they would, ‘to support and enhance the multistakeholder model of Internet policymaking and governance’ give up this control. However, they clarified that they would not accept a proposal that replaces the NTIA role with a government-led or an inter-governmental organization solution. This means, the US state influence over ICANN would not be replaced by any other mutli-government body but instead a multistakeholder body, which is the current internal structure of ICANN now.

Governments and corporations have already flexed their muscles at ICANN 50. France made public their doubt’s at ICANN’s ability to handle these complex processes. Joining them, the EU also stated it had lost its faith in ICANN processes. An African Union representative echoed similar concerns over the .africa gTLD. However, others have backed ICANN, such as Australia and of course, the US itself. Therefore, one of the main-stages of internet governance – which handles such a critical resource – will be an area to watch in the coming days to track its future. For India, and for all .indians too!

[Mahima Kaul is a Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, Delhi and writes about internet/media governance, inclusion and security issues.]

Tuesday, July 01, 2014

Index: India’s social media “peace force”

Indians have organised online to stop social media postings looking to incite communal tension. Will it work, and is it a threat to free expression? 

A month has passed since Narendra Modi became prime minister of India, and brought the right wing Hindu nationalist BJP (Bharatiya Janta Party) back into power. Much has been written about his government, with observers either hailing him as an economic messiah who will fix India’s dwindling economy or a divisive politician who has built his career on the back of communalism.

Those watching freedoms, especially of free speech and the media, are among the people apprehensive about life under Modi’s government. While the prime minister himself has blogged about the importance of free expression, recent arrests, including of citizens directly critical of him, paint a worrying picture. Additionally, the rise of “communal posts” on social media, real or planed, have lead to violence on the ground, and a debate about how best to police social media and free speech online.

In June, a young Muslim IT graduate lost his life to an angry mob in the city of Pune, Maharashtra, due to violence that erupted after morphed pictures of a historical figure appeared on Facebook and WhatsApp. The pictures were said to be triggers for crowds to damage shops and public transport, ultimately resulting in communal violence and the loss of an innocent life. However, reports from the Anti Terror Squad of the Maharashtra police indicate that the outbreak of violence following the uploaded picture does not seem sporadic or unplanned.

The state government has issued familiar warnings about the misuse of social media by groups that are looking to incite communal tension. Home Minister, R. R. Patil, was quoted as saying that “anti-social elements are posting inflammatory posts to stoke hatred, bitterness and disharmony between sects”, warning that such posts could result in action not just against those who post the photos, but also those who “like” them. Of course, this was the same state which saw two girls were arrested last year for allegedly sparking communal violence – one for writing a Facebook update, and the other girl simply for “liking” it. Therefore, any action by the government needs to be tempered by what the fallout could be for ordinary citizens and their right to free speech.

But authorities are not alone in seeking a solution to the problem of potentially inflammatory social media postings – civil society groups are also trying novel ideas to counter the trend. Ravi Ghate, a social entrepreneur and founder of a community SMS newsletter in Maharashtra, has banded together with like-minded folks to form a group on Facebook called “Social Peace Force”. Amassing over 18,000 members in ten days, the mission of the group is to “stop anti-social messages on Facebook” by reporting them as spam. “It’s the easiest and technological way to fight the culprits who are spreading anti-national messages/images and stopping ourselves from development!” is the logic the group adheres to. Many of the new members have posted comments indicating their genuine desire to help stop the spread of abusive and communal messages. Therefore, once identified, all members of the group will report a message or posting to Facebook thereby pressurising them to remove the post before it can do any more damage. The group has also instituted a panel of experts who are meant to examine any troubling post and give the go-ahead for the group to act.

What has spurred this move? “How many times can you go to court,” Ghate told Index. “It is too expensive. And the problem is that by the time the police takes down the content, the riot has already taken place.” For them, “suppressing content at the source” in a timely manner is key. A technological solution within the boundaries of Facebook’s own rules of engagement seems to some a far more pragmatic solution than going to the courts again and again.

Seen from a broader lens however, the group’s solution seems to be to shift the onus from the courts to decide the parameters of free expression and “objectionable” content, to big, profit-making, multinational corporates. What might seem today a no-brainer because of some obviously mischievous content, could in time, pose an interesting dilemma: Should social media giants control the boundaries of (social media based) speech in countries such as India, based on their own internal policies, and not the laws of the land? And all this, because of a push by the citizens themselves, to bypass courts and go directly to the corporates.

It is ironic that “Big Brother’ – which is what some newspaper headlines called the group – when translated into Hindi could be interpreted as “elder brother”, indicating a protective instinct, which certainly seems to be the case here. The current mandate of the group is only to focus on religious content to keep “social harmony”. That in itself is not a straightforward task; just ask Wendy Doniger, author of ‘The Hindus: An Alternative History’. However, this and the many spinoff groups they will inspire could morph into something they did not intend. Legitimate art, literature, satire and other forms of expression could become victims of the mob. Then there is danger of more organised groups and political parties taking to social media directly to suppress content — especially political critique — on a regular basis. And finally, those who wish to subvert social media platforms to have an excuse to incite violence on the street, will certainly find more creative ways to do so.

There is of course, the other side of the coin. Will Facebook remove content that has been pre-determined to be objectionable when faced with a large number of people reporting it? The simple answer is, we don’t know. Facebook has its own community standards, and these cover a broad range of topics, including the following: “Facebook does not permit hate speech, but distinguishes between serious and humorous speech. While we encourage you to challenge ideas, institutions, events, and practices, we do not permit individuals or groups to attack others based on their race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, sex, gender, sexual orientation, disability or medical condition.”

And a recent experiment by an Indian think-tank revealed that Facebook did not necessarily remove content flagged as objectionable by users, solely on the basis of it being flagged. As Facebook told them: “We reviewed the post you reported for harassment and found it doesn’t violate our Community Standards.” It is quite possible that the newly formed Social Peace Force will feel let down by Facebook as well, if content is not removed immediately. What happens then?

However, this latest development harks back to the problems with India’s current legal mechanisms. India’s IT Act has become infamous for a certain Section 66(A) which can be used to arrest people for information used for the purposes of “annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill will”. Public outrage at wrongful arrests led to the courts passing an order that no person would be arrested without “prior approval from an officer not below the rank of inspector general of police”. At the same time, the establishment is not above slapping graver charges (such as inciting communal violence) under other sections of Indian law — including the Indian Penal Code — for fairly innocuous activity. This has lead to some amount of distrust at the government’s own commitment to freedom of expression.

Of course, citizens have a right to appeal to social media platforms if they take offense to any content posted there. The point remains, however, that maintaining communal harmony and law and order is a tricky and layered problem. The role of the state, and the loss of confidence citizens have in it, must be addressed as well. Earlier solutions have included the state governments of Jammu and Kashmir preempting violence by switching off social media and YouTube for a few days, in the wake of burgeoning riots around the world because of the video “The Innocence of Muslims”. At another time, the government of India restricted text messages to five a day to curtail vicious rumours targeting a minority community settled in south India. India’s National Integration Council met in September 2013 after social media posts had been blamed for causing riots in Uttar Pradesh, and many states are setting up social media monitoring departments to raise “red flags”, much like the Social Peace Force itself.

A coherent and honest study of the abuse of social media platforms by fringe groups to incite violence should take place. Given the fast paced nature of the medium, the question for a country as prone to communal riots as India is: how can one control them? Is counter-speech to drown out hate speech a strategy to be employed? Is clamping down on free speech effectively going to reduce religious intolerance? Does bypassing legal routes and going straight to the “source” help? A national dialogue on the matter might be more fruitful in the long run than the flowering of surveillance groups cutting across the board — be they citizen or state-led.

Thursday, June 26, 2014

Stockholm Internet Forum 2014: VIDEO LINKS

Was busy summer holidaying and forgot to share this video -- a great sign of the times in my opinion :)

However, at the end of May, I was on a panel entitled "Privacy for civil society and
business: managing data collection" hosed by BBC Hard Talk's Stephen
Sackur at the Stockholm Internet Forum, Sweden.

Short interview link:

Link to the panel:

Also --  was on India Post Live again -- great new addition to the online news portal world -- and we discussed social media + elections.

Have a look -

Wednesday, May 21, 2014

It might finally be hip to be Hindu

Indians, ever a chatty lot, are obsessed with the idea of being obsessed with social media. That is why, as the BJP’s stunning victory in the Indian general elections was declared, the news media immediately began to examine the impact of social media campaigning in the elections. Numbers aside, the victory over social media has revealed the fault lines of Indian society as it stands today.

India’s online population is small as compared to its offline population – about 213 million users to 1.2 billion people – but it is growing. Though these figures expand and contract depending on whom you ask, we do know that 33 million are on Twitter and Facebook has hit the 100 million-user mark. Given these statistics, it is indeed impressive that India’s newest Prime Minister, Narendra Modi has 4.2 million followers on Twitter already. The would-be leader of opposition, Rahul Gandhi, whose party did not win enough seats to actually assume the seat as leader of the opposition in parliament, isn’t on Twitter. However, his party has an account, with about 181,000 followers. There are other political stars on social media, including individual members of various parties, and notably, members of the newly formed Aam Aadmi Party.

However, when asked the question: “who won the social media war” – because, to be sure, there was one – the answer can only really be Narendra Modi. In fact, his own campaign machinery was so well oiled that his personal profile overshadowed his party.  “Ab ki baar, Modi Sarkar” (this time, a Modi government) was arguably the catchiest slogan on the campaign and it inspired many a joke, including a takeover of the nursery rhyme – “twinkle, twinkle, little star, ab ki baar, Modi sarkar!”  And according to reports, the BJP was mentioned on Twitter, on average, about 30,000 times a day, with the Congress trailing behind at between 15,000-20,000. Modi’s victory tweet promising a better India after election results were declared was retweeted 69,872 times.
Truthfully, there is no way that social media could have supplanted the traditional route. Modi’s tireless campaigning – 437 rallies, 5,827 public interface events across 25 states that is a distance of 300,000km – is impressive. But, equally impressive was the BJP’s entire digital campaign effort; a “social media war room” that reportedly cost Rs 35 lakh (35,000 GBP), with 30 computers and about 50 volunteers, tracking activities across India’s 92,000 villages. And accounts from insiders, young professionals, many whom took sabbaticals from their jobs to participate in this campaign, talks of a breathless environment, where Facebook was used to crowdsource ideas for speeches, and ‘Mission 272’ (in terms of how many seats they were aiming to win) became a reality. In fact, many creative contributions from BJP’s supporters – videos, jingles, songs and poems – can be found on the website.

At the same time, social media has been very revealing about the state of the Indian majority. The tonality of political discourse over the internet, which was very polarized between the Hindu rightwingers and secularists saw vicious language, trolling and hate speech dotting the landscape. However, the Hindu right, abused as communal in the time of the Congress government have emerged victorious and unapologetic about their political leanings. In public groups on Google Plus, cyber Hindus declare that a “pro Hindu lobby is not an option, but a sheer necessity.” In fact, the ‘liberal’ discourse that sweeps much of the mainstream English media was taken aback at the sweeping victory that the BJP has earned in this election. There is nervousness that the BJP, supported and guided by the RSS – Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh—a right-wing, nationalist group espousing strict discipline, martial training and self sacrifice in defence of the Motherland, often derided for being extremist – will work towards a majoritarian agenda where minorities will find less space to exist. These fears are compounded by the RSS’s beliefs – formalized in annual reports – that seek to impose a strict moral code that frowns upon live-in relations, homosexuality and also keeping an eye on minority communities. The RSS has being heartened by educated Indians joining their cause via social media, thereby signaling that their views might no longer be frowned upon as extreme or communal. They do not want to apologize for representing the view of the Hindu right.

And on cue, Narendra Modi, in a rousing speech formally accepting his role as the leader of the majority party in Parliament, promised his fellow BJP MPs that by the birth anniversary of Pandit Deendayal Upadhyaya in 2016, co-founder of the Bharitiya Jan Sangh that later became the BJP as known today, India shall rise to its promise of being a great nation. Tying down his campaign promises to his deep association with the RSS, the signal is clear. Indeed, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the former Prime Minister, had affirmed proudly that “the Sangh is my soul”. The Hindu is back in Hindustan (another name for India).

An analysis in India Today magazine has declared the Indian cybersphere ‘saffron’ (the color associated with the Hindu right) writing, “But their agenda is a mix of post-modern and traditional. They oppose dynasty politics, particularly the Nehru-Gandhi clan and its allies such as Shiv Sena. They call minority appeasement ‘pseudo-secularism’ with such fervour that their sentiment could easily be interpreted as Hindu supremacist or anti-Muslim. They are against lower-caste reservation, particularly because it is poorly implemented. They are concerned about internal security. But above all, they are against corruption.” In deconstructing the ways of the Hindu saffron social media user, the article offers certain clues, such as the words “proud”, “patriot” and “Hindu” appearing in their bios, and often uploading images of Hindu gods as their display picture.

The people have spoken. The media is filled with analysis that people have either embraced Modi for his Hindu leanings, or ignored them in order realize the dream of “development” that is has promised to deliver. The number of Muslim MPs in parliament is down to 21 from 30 in the last session, the lowest number since India’s first elections.  The Congress and its allies, who built careers on carefully constructed platforms of secularism – in their first term, they had a Muslim President, Sikh Prime Minister and Christian leader of the party – have been set aside in favour of a openly religious and Hindu BJP. Whatever be the reasons for the vote, for the everyday people tweeting and Facebooking, it appears that being pro-Hindu is slowly being disassociated with being communal. For many, this is a relief.

It seems it might finally be hip to be Hindu.

Monday, May 12, 2014

The need for speed?

A friend recently blogged about the Indian elections and wrote in his post about a tweet from the Aam Admi Party’s Somnath Bharti, in frustration as he wasn’t able to upload a video of his party workers being beaten up in Amethi, that he would have done so if the broadband would have been better. It struck my friend as funny, at the time, but it struck me as very telling. Amethi could be considered one of India’s VIP constituencies, a stronghold of the Gandhi family. Even an offhand comment about the inadequacy of the quality of broadband exposes how far away India really is from not just proving the internet to its people, but providing quality access. It also made me wonder how governments of the day blame YouTube for their communal law and order problems, given that YouTube is painfully slow to load in New Delhi itself most of the time – but I digress.

If TV adverts were anything to go by, India is nodding along to “what an Idea sirjee” and a plethora of celebrities are using 3G to post silly videos of each other. Urban youth have no concerns outside Facebook and Twitter, and everyone seems to have only content to create, with the speed of broadband a given.

And then there is the mainstream media which reports on what “Twitter” is saying about any given subject, and either feeds off gossip and opinions on the social media platform or then tries to lead the discussion over there by asking its patrons to tweet using hashtags.  Just to put it in context, India’s Twitter base is roughly 33 million, which is 2.75% of India’s entire population.

And, as far as the two national parties go, the BJP manifesto speaks of an innovative and technology driven society that is globally competitive. It mentions e-government at some length. The Congress manifesto too, talks of connecting every village in India with broadband in three years to open ‘vast new opportunities’, but no specific employment opportunities in urban and sei-urban areas. Currently, Karnataka, which boasts of India’s IT hub Bangalore, is under a Congress government. On another note, the Aam Aadmi Party, India’s first urban underdog political party talks about using information technology to promote transparency and reduce corruption in government. There is no other specific reference to the potential of the internet in India.

In fact, outside official lines in party mandates (and the most in the BJP’s), this election season has slowly seen the campaigns devolve from talk of development to the usual caste and communal equations. Therefore, it might be pertinent for them to be reminded about what is at stake right for the country in the coming years.

The numbers speak for themselves, released by the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India. As of February 2014, the number of broadband subscribers in India was 14.80 million, about 1.71% up from the previous month. Growing even more rapidly are the number of users access the internet through their mobiles or dongles, which stood at 42.81 million in February 2014, a growth of 2.05% from January 2014. The top five wired broadband providers in India are BSNL (9.98 million), Bharti (1.39 million), MTNL (1.10 million), YOU Broadband (0.37 million) and Beam Telecom (0.37 million). As for the top wireless broadband service providers, there is Bharti (10.60 million), Reliance (6.98 million), Idea (6.50 million), BSNL (6.38 million) and Vodafone (6.14 million).

Studies analyze the potential of the internet not just in social terms, but economic. A McKinsey report published in December 2013 called “Online and Upcoming: The Internet’s Impact on India” reveals that the Internet contributes 1.6% of India’s GDP, roughly $30 billion. The report says this could grow to 2.8 to 3.3% by 2015 if India achieves its potential for growth with respect to the number of Internet users and Internet technology-related consumption and investment. However, according to a joint report by KPMG and ASSOCHAM, India is currently losing about 70% of its new business in the Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) industry to competitors like Philippines and Eastern Europe. This is in part because of rising costs in bigger metros, and the lack of English speaking employees. The solution lies not just in vocational training schemes but also in moving these offices to tier 2 and tier 3 cities. Not taking swift action could cost approximately $30 billion in foreign exchange earnings.

In country that ranks 123 in the world when it comes to average broadband connection speed and 125 in average peak connection speed, according to the ‘State of the Internet’ report by Akamai, this is a serious challenge. For example, in India, a broadband leader like Airtel offers speeds from 1 Mbps up to a maximum of 100 Mbps (on fiber based broadband network in urban Delhi) while in Guna,(a small town in MP),  the range of offered broadband speed is from 512 kbps to 2 Mbps. In rural areas, BSNL offers speeds of 512 kbps to 2 mbps. However, experts say that the difference between actual and promised speed varies a lot from place to place. The actual speed could range from 90% but go as low was 20% of what is advertised. This is dependent on the network and the customer premise equipment. For all this to improve, a sense of urgency needs to enter the Indian market. As Rajan Anandan, Managing Director of Google India, said in a recent interview, “nobody in the world except India defines 512 kbps as broadband.” Late in 2013, the government of India cleared a proposal to provide three internet connections and one wi-fi hotspot in each of the 2.5 lakh gram panchayats spread across the country. The project should be completed by March 2016. The plan is to provide 100 Mbps broadband speeds to all the gram panchayats in the country.

In terms of mobile broadband, ‘the next big thing’ according to numbers, there is still a while to go. Telecom providers are aggressively offering 3G services and the use of smartphone in India is on the rise. However, following complaints about the quality of service, the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) has started a consultation process for setting minimum download speeds of 1Mbps for 3G connections and 56Kbps for 2G connections.

Ultimately, both the spread and speed of the internet in India will have a direct impact on India’s economy. But that’s not all. Somnath Bharti and million others will be able to upload videos and tweet – be they of political relevance or not. India’s e-government schemes will find faster delivery of services. Sectors like e-commerce will be able to grow. And India’s IT and ITES sectors, which contribute up to 9% of the country’s GDP, will also remain in the race to be a sure avenue for employment and income generation.

That certainly deserves a mention in a campaign speech!

India’s public service broadcaster at center of political row

The India media is the subject of the news yet again. This time though, the private news channels — the usual suspects – are only reporting the news. Instead, the latest war of words among politicians has thrown the public service broadcaster, Doordarshan, into the limelight.

Narendra Modi, prime ministerial candidate for the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was interviewed by Doordarshan, and it appears that comments he made about a friendship with a senior member of the ruling Indian National Congress were edited out of the final interview. The news broke on social media, and immediately the channel was accused of censoring the statements that might make Congress seem too chummy with their sworn opposition.

The CEO of Doordarshan, Jawhar Sircar, in a letter to the board of Prasar Bharti, the autonomous body that runs the channel, made it very clear that the public broadcaster does indeed suffer from government interference. Reportedly, Sircar wrote in his letter that there has been a lost opportunity to convince a “young minister to break this long traditional linkage between the ministry and the News Division, which has continued unabated long after Prasar Bharati was born and assigned its distinct role in 1997”. This is a direct reference to the current Minister of Information and Broadcasting, Manish Tewari. In the same report, carried by the Economic Times, a member of the Congress have rubbished this claim, saying that Sircar is “merely currying favour with the new dispensation as he had never raised the issue of autonomy earlier”.

Narendra Modi interview isn’t the first time Sircar has brought up the question of autonomy for the broadcaster. Sircar’s personal website carried news items relating to “freeing Prasar Bharti from government control”, papers that suggest DD could follow the BBC’s annual license fee model, as well as older news items about how the channel, under the Congress-led UPA government has previously neglected to give Narendra Modi the kind of airtime the private channels have accorded. For his part, Minister Tewari has made a statement that “autonomy of Prasar Bharti is guaranteed by an act of Parliament. I&B ministry has an arms length relationship with Prasar Bharti”.

One can be sure the complaints about airtime will be flipped around if another party forms the government. Therefore, politics aside, the basic question needs to be addressed: despite an autonomous status, does the government in fact wield undue influence over Prasar Bharti (which includes radio as well)?

The current structure of the public broadcaster stands as such: the Prasar Bharti is an autonomous body that answers to the Parliament of India through the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. All of its staff are officers recruited through the Union Public Service Commission, and are transferred to their positions at Prasar Bharti after having served in other government departments. There is belief that this might be the reason for the “government” mindset shown in the two directorates under the body; All India Radio or Akashvani, and Doordarshan, the television broadcaster. In fact, till 1997, both had been directly under the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, but had been given this separation to be able to function in a “fair, objective and creative manner”.

The government had appointed a committee under Sam Pitroda, a man who is credited for helping Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi bring the telecom revolution to India in the 1980s, to present a report on the function of Prasar Bharti. The report batted for more autonomy for the broadcaster, but went further and suggested that it also be open to use private sources of funding and monetizing its assets. In an event to release the report, Pitroda said that the broadcaster must “look at public interest and not just government interest”. Along with input on technology, human resource and content, the two volume report (which had the current CEO as a member) also delves into government and organisation. The suggestions include transferring complete ownership and management of assets to Prasar Bharti to make the organisation administratively and financially autonomous of the government, and setting up a regulatory body to ensure public accountability of all content on their radio and television networks, while acknowledging that the state does have a distinct requirement to “broadcast messages and accomplishments of public interest which can be met by using existing public and private broadcaster infrastructure”.

The report was submitted to the government in February 2014, and is “under consideration”. It will be up to the next government, to be formed in mid-May, to take action, especially in light of the recent controversy.

Not all are convinced of real change taking place on the ground. In editorial a few months before the report was released, the Pioneer suggested that “the Government supports the idea of an autonomous public broadcaster, in practice it has never been able to let go. Unless this fundamental dichotomy is resolved —either the Government gives up control or relinquishes the autonomy idea — the Government will continue to have a complicated relationship with Prasar Bharati, no matter how many expert committees it sets up. In the meantime, the tax-payer-funded broadcaster will continue to drain the exchequer and be of even less use to the public.” Others, such as media analyst Sevanti Ninan of The Hoot even questioned the genuine interest the government has in reforming the broadcaster by initiating the Pitroda expert committee, asking: “I don’t know why they are undertaking this just before the elections time because if there are radical recommendations there is no time to implement them.” In an article on the subject she addresses the crucial question of attracting talent, writing that “to attract the best personnel the salary/ package should be linked with the market compensation. The tenure of full time members should be for a period of five years and for the Independent Directors for a period of three years. So, no more pegging salaries at a level that only attracts applications from former government personnel. The CEO of Prasar Bharati so far, in its 16 years of existence, has always been a former IAS officer.” There are also serious updates needed in technology upgradation, content and presentation of the news.

For the moment, Doordarshan is thinking about probing into the matter of the edited Narendra Modi interview. But the larger problem cannot be solved on a case-to-case basis. Since 1996, Pitroda’s would be the fourth panel the government has created to look into this issue of Prasar Bharti. It would well be worth the effort for a new government to give the public service broadcaster to the public.